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Summary 
The Doha declaration on trade and environment proposed to clarify the relationship 
between multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) trade obligations and WTO rules 
by only guaranteeing economic integration upon ratification of certain MEAs. In other 
words, it pushed to authorize the use of trade measures against non-compliance, denying 
a non-signatory of its WTO rights to exercise countervailing tariffs. This paper 
demonstrates that the Doha proposal can be effective when environmental policy and its 
trade obligations are endogenous. Under plausible circumstances, ratification by a non-
signatory to the MEA along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium 
outcome. Delocation to pollution havens does not occur, as optimal tariffs are positive if 
standards are not adopted. Tariffs however only work as a credible threat and do not 
emerge in equilibrium. Results are consistent with broad empirical evidence that 
opposes the pollution haven hypothesis and suggests capital movements to be non-
pollution related. 
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1. Introduction 
The link between trade liberalization and environmental protection is increasingly gaining 
importance with the latter constituting a bigger part of WTO rounds in recent years.
1 The 
primary debate led by environmentalists is that trade liberalization damages the environment. 
One argument has been that in the absence of trade policy instruments, governments may be 
tempted to distort their environmental policies to protect their domestic economy. If allowed, 
they can impose a loose regime of environmental regulation for fear that tougher 
environmental policies may damage the competitiveness of their firms.
2 Such policies may 
also cause domestic firms to relocate plants abroad to pollution havens, mainly developing 
countries (South), or close down altogether in response to foreign competition that faces less 
strict environmental regulation and hence lower production costs.  
When it comes to enforcing environmental standards on a global level, the South has shown 
to be lagging behind regardless of rising international concern over the environment. While 
intellectual property rights have officially found their way onto the WTO agenda through the 
TRIPS agreement and labor standards have failed to make a convincing case for inclusion, 
environmental protection remains in a limbo state. The notion of enforcing environmental 
standards globally through the WTO is however moving closer to realization with the latter 
devoting greater attention to environmental negotiations in recent rounds. A significant part of 
the Doha declaration in 2001 for instance dealt with trade and environment.
3 In fact, there are 
about 200  multilateral  environmental  agreements (MEA) in place today, of which 
                                                 
1 For a survey of traditional and strategic literature on environment and trade see Neary (2000). 
2 Barrett (1994) for instance shows that in imperfectly competitive international markets, governments 
may be tempted to impose a weak environmental policy where the marginal cost of abatement is less 
than the marginal damage from pollution.  
3 Neary (2004) addresses and analyzes the key issues of the Doha development agenda and obstacles 
that must be overcome for successful negotiations in future rounds of the WTO.    4
only 20 contain  trade  provisions.
4 Loopholes currently allow non-signatories to use their 
WTO rights to protest trade restrictions put against them by a MEA. This has lead to 
suggestions to eliminate such free riding opportunities by only allowing WTO members that 
are also parties to a MEA to practice their WTO rights. As a first step, ministers have agreed 
in the new Article 31 (i) of the Doha text to launch negotiations on the relationship between 
existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs.
5 WTO in this case could 
give a signatory country the choice to only accept greater economic integration with another 
country if the latter agrees to ratify and adopt stronger environmental standards. In other 
words, it allows rivals of a non-signatory country to impose punishing tariffs on its imports 
for having laxer environmental regulations in the case of non-compliance (http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min01_e/mindecl_e.htm).
6 Can such tariffs be justified, and if 
so, what is their impact on the location of firms and environmental policies in the South? 
Theoretical literature on environmental policy and the location of firms goes as far back as 
Markusen, et al. (1993). They look at exogenous trade costs and environmental policies and 
show that the latter can have a very strong impact on a firm’s decision about location when 
                                                 
4 Examples are the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Basel 
Convention on the international movement of toxic waste, and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol aimed at curbing emissions of greenhouse gas.  
5 WTO ministerial conference in Doha set Jan. 1, 2005 as the deadline for negotiations on clarifying the 
relationship between WTO rules and the trade obligations established by the MEAs. The fifth WTO 
ministerial conference in Cancun however did not give much emphasis to green issues and no 
consensus was reached to produce a new mandate or reaffirm the existing timeframe. 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm) 
6 Barrett (1997) shows how committing to trade sanctions in a MEA such as the Montreal Protocol can 
work as a credible threat to deter free-riding and sustain cooperation. Zigic (2000) further shows how 
punitive tariffs can be used as a credible threat to improve intellectual property rights regime in the 
same spirit as they are projected to improve environmental standards in the Doha proposal.   5
firms are “footloose”. Motta and Thisse (1994) consider a different setting where firms are 
initially established in their country of origin and do not incur any fixed cost when operating 
at home. They also examine the impact of a country’s exogenous environmental policy on the 
location and production choices of its firm.
7 They show that a firm is less likely to relocate as 
a response to environmental policies because fixed costs of establishing a domestic plant are 
sunk when the game begins. Hoel (1997) extends the study to endogenize environmental 
policy demonstrating that governments have an incentive to choose loose environmental 
standards to attract firms as long as the disutility from pollution is not high enough to promote 
a ‘Not In My Back Yard’ policy. Finally, Ulph and Valentini (2001) show on the contrary that 
environmental dumping is greater when plants are ‘not’ footloose as this can create strategic 
rent-shifting incentives for governments. On the empirical side, studies on the issue have 
largely rejected any link between firm location and environmental policy. Smarzynska and 
Wei (2001), Eskeland and Harrison (2003) and Grether and Melo (2003) are a few examples 
of recent empirical works that find little or no evidence on the pollution haven hypothesis.  
This paper endogenizes the decision of firms on location and governments’ policies on trade 
and environment to see whether proposals made at the Doha round can be effectively 
implemented. It shows that when pollution related costs realistically constitute only a small 
portion of firms’ total cost, tariffs can work in line with Barrett (1997) as a successful credible 
threat to make environmental harmonization and free trade the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome.
8 If a non-signatory country deviates, optimal green tariffs are positive 
                                                 
7 In their model they also give the multinational firm the choice of closing down home production 
altogether and establishing a plant abroad to serve both markets. Additionally, they assume the other 
firm to be a local firm with its location (as well as the other country’s policy) as given. 
8 Although we examine all levels of pollution tax in the paper, only very low values reflect reality and 
are of relevance for the results. A wide range of studies such as Noerdstrom and Vaughan (1999) show 
that pollution related costs only account for a very small proportion of a firm’s total costs.  These costs 
only come up to no more than 1% of production costs for an average industry in the North and at most 
5% for the worst polluters. Hence, we emphasize the results for low enough levels of emission tax.      6
eliminating multinationals’ incentives to delocate.
9 Therefore, the so-called escape to 
pollution havens is not an equilibrium outcome in accordance with recent empirical findings, 
and all capital movements occur due to other non-pollution related factors.  
The Doha proposal is illustrated in the following game: in the first stage, the Southern 
government chooses whether or not to adopt standards taking into consideration that the 
North can impose a tariff against its imports in the second stage upon non-compliance. If the 
South chooses to harmonize its environmental standards, tariffs are abolished to allow for 
economic integration as a complement or a reward. The governments also anticipate firms’ 
decision on output and location. The Northern firm moves next by choosing location in the 
third stage and competes in production with the Southern firm in the final stage. The stages of 
the game are illustrated in figure 1. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the model and solves the final two stages of the game when environmental 
standards are not enforced in the South. Section 3 introduces the other branch of the game 
where the South ratifies with the MEA and shows the outcome on output and location under 
harmonized standards. Section 4 finds the optimal tariff set by the North and the optimal 
environmental policy chosen by the South, and analyzes possible equilibria of the Doha 
proposal. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Asymmetric Environmental Standards 
2.1. The Model 
There are two countries in the model: the North and the South. The regions are assumed to be 
symmetric in all aspects aside from their environmental regulations. The North is assumed to 
enforce environmental standards by imposing a pollution tax on emissions released by firms 
during production. The South in contrast can choose to adopt standards and enjoy trade 
liberalization or to keep its lax environmental regulations and pay tariffs.
10 The latter option 
                                                 
9 Green tariffs refer to trade barriers raised for environmental purposes, i.e. trade obligations in MEAs. 
10 While Southern policy with regards to participating in a MEA is endogenized, the magnitude of the 
standards required in the MEA remains exogenous in the model.    7
allows local as well as foreign firms operating in the South to produce without any additional 
charges for causing pollution. There is however a green tariff in this case set optimally by the 
North against all dirty imports from the South, including re-exports of the Northern firm.
11  
The model assumes two firms with one belonging to each country. They produce a 
homogeneous good and compete in an oligopolistic manner à la Cournot. Firms compete in 
segmented markets and choose the optimal output for each market separately. The Northern 
firm is a multinational and can decide on production location. It can stay at home and serve 
both markets from its Northern headquarters. It can also build a subsidiary in the South to 
serve the Southern market, but still maintain production in the North to serve its home 
interests. Alternatively, it can close down home production altogether and completely 
delocate for pollution-related purposes to serve both markets from the South. The Southern 
firm on the other hand is assumed to be a local firm for simplicity and only produces in its 
domestic country.
12  
Demand is assumed to be linear and takes the familiar form 
S N i for Q a p i i , = − = ,                 ( 1 )  
where Q is the total consumption in each region, and subscripts N and S represent the North 
and the South. Total consumption in each region is 
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where the first subscript indicates where the good is produced and the second denotes where it 
is consumed. Superscript E represents the case where the Northern firm produces only in the 
North and exports to the South, F when it undertakes FDI to serve the Southern market 
locally, and D when it completely delocates and re-exports back to the North. The tilde above 
q denotes a situation where both firms produce in the South, while a star distinguishes 
                                                 
11 Note that the model only considers goods that are directly related to the environmental problem. 
12 This locational framework follows Motta and Thiesse (1994).    8
Northern foreign production from local output by the Southern firm. The costs of production 
are divided between non-pollution related costs c and pollution tax τ paid on emissions that 
are released from producing one unit of the good.  
Looking at the case of non-compliance in the rest of this section, the profit function for the 
Northern firm when all of its production takes place in the North is 
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where e0 represents the unit emission discharged by each firm. It also denotes the pollution 
intensity of the industry at hand. This locational scenario implies that the Northern firm must 
pay a pollution tax on its entire production. When it builds a subsidiary in the South to serve 
each market locally, it only pays a pollution tax on the goods it produces in the North for the 
domestic market: 
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Γ is the fixed cost of setting up a plant abroad which is independent of output. If the Northern 
firm completely delocates to serve both markets from the South, it avoids paying pollution 
taxes altogether, but is bound to pay tariffs on its exports back to the North:  
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The profit of the Southern firm takes the form 
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for each scenario that prevails subsequent to the Northern firm’s decision on production 
location. Recall that there is no environmental tax enforced in the South here, but a tariff is 
paid on Southern exports to the North.
13 Adopting backward induction, section 2.2 first solves 
the problem of firms in the final stage where they compete in output.  
 
                                                 
13 Tariffs and pollution taxes have been normalized to the market size to allow for the elimination of    
(a-c) from all upcoming equations.   9
2.2. Production 
In the export case, production by the Northern firm in the North for each market is 
3
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1 2 0 − ≥ e t τ  is a constraint for qNN>0 to hold so that the Northern firm continues to serve its 






≤  is also a necessary condition for the 
Southern firm to maintain its exports to the North, i.e. for qSN>0. This threshold value of t 
stops the importation of all dirty products to the North by blocking trade and gives the 
Northern firm a monopoly position in its home market. Such prohibitive tariff rates denote a 
complete ban on imports from the South making values of t above this level irrelevant for the 
analysis. In the case of FDI, qNN and qSN remain similar to (5) and (8) as the Northern firm 
keeps producing for its home market from a local plant. It however builds a subsidiary in the 
South to serve the latter locally, making the output aimed at the South  
3
1 ~ * ~ = = SS SS q q                               (7’) 
for both firms. When the Northern firm delocates, production for the Southern market by both 
firms remains the same as (7’). The Northern firm also produces for its domestic market in the 
South and re-exports back to the North, making production by both firms aimed at the North  
3
1 ~ * ~ t
q q SN SN
−
= = .                                        (8’) 
                                                 
14 It will be seen that this constraint is never binding as it coincides with the scenario of complete 
delocation, where the Northern firm does not produce at home and no longer pays an emission tax.   10
If the Northern firm produces at home for the domestic market, the direct effect of tariffs is to 
increase local production in the North and reduce imports from the South. Stricter standards 
per se have the reverse effect of reducing Northern production and encouraging production by 
the Southern firm.  When the Northern firm exports to the South, τ affects the entire 
production by both firms, whereas with FDI only goods targeted at the Northern market are 
influenced. As under FDI both firms produce in the South for the Southern market where no 
pollution tax exists, the optimal quantity produced by both firms resembles that in a typical 
Cournot case. Finally, if the Northern firm completely closes down production in the North 
and establishes a plant in the South to serve both markets, pollution taxes become irrelevant 
and tariffs reduce the exports of both firms to the North.  
2.3. Location 
In the third stage of the game, the Northern multinational must choose where to locate to 
serve each market. By substituting the optimal output back into the Northern firm’s profit 
function and comparing the profits for each case, we can find the locational outcome that 
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Looking first at profits of keeping all production in the North against establishing an extra 
plant in the South, we can see that in the absence of relocation costs Γ, a firm would always 
be better off by serving each market through a local subsidiary.
15 The critical level of fixed 
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15 This also reflects the branch of literature on environment and firms’ location pioneered by Markusen 
et al. (1993) that assumes firms to be footloose. Thus, there are no extra costs for relocation as they 
incur a plant specific fixed cost regardless of whether they build a plant at home or in the other region. 
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When fixed costs are below this level, costs of relocation are sufficiently low making FDI the 
preferable scenario. Otherwise, relocation is too costly and the Northern firm keeps all 
production at home anyway leaving no concern about the supplementary influence of 
environmental policies on firm location. This scenario reflects a situation where there is no 
threat of relocation due to very high plant-specific fixed costs, or inflexible foreign 
investment laws and political instability in the host country. As we are interested in a case 
where relocation is at least partly an option, this paper focuses on a situation with sufficiently 
low fixed costs of relocation. The export scenario where the Northern firm keeps all 
production in the North is therefore ruled out under asymmetric standards.
16  
We can now concentrate on the comparison between profits under FDI and delocation to 
distinguish between the standard form of capital movement and relocation due to pollution-
related reasons. The threshold tariff rate below which the Northern firm completely delocates 
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Figure 2 shows the locational choice of the Northern firm in the space of τ and t for an 
emission level of e0=1. It is easy to see that a higher pollution tax in the North makes 
delocation to the South more attractive. The shaded area shows the region where tariffs halt 





 implies that tougher standards require a higher tariff on dirty goods from the 
South to impede delocation. We can also see that in the case of free trade, profits of 
completely delocating to the South are always higher than having local facilities in each 
country. This reinforces the complementary nature of economic integration and 
environmental standards by showing that without a trade policy, the smallest amount of 
                                                 
16 The dividing line between the export and the FDI case has been studied in Motta and Thisse (1994). 
It plays a more important role in their analysis, as they also look at differences in the market size 
between regions and changes in fixed costs of establishing a plant.    12
pollution tax could result in complete delocation of multinationals to countries with lax 
environmental regulations. As tariffs rise, delocation becomes less attractive for a larger range 
of Northern pollution tax.  
3. Environmental Harmonization and Trade Liberalization  
This section of the paper analyzes the consequences of policies that suggest global 
harmonization of environmental regulations. This can be interpreted as a successful 
implementation of policies discussed at the WTO Doha round, to only allow those WTO 
members integrate and enjoy trade liberalization who have ratified a MEA and raised their 
environmental standards to the level in force in signatory countries. Here the South upgrades 
its standards to the level imposed in the North, namely τ, and enjoys free trade as a reward, 
i.e. tariff t is abolished.  
There is only one possible scenario in the case of harmonized standards as liberalized trade 
and symmetry in environmental policies make the multinational indifferent about location. 
There are no incentives for relocation in such situation, and the smallest form of relocation 
fixed costs causes firms to remain in their home country. Both firms now pay the pollution tax 
τ on the emissions they release during production, while trade is liberalized. The profit 
functions of the two firms are now 
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where superscript H stands for harmonized environmental standards. In this case, the quantity 
produced by each firm for the domestic and the foreign market is identical: 
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Profits are equal for both firm under harmonized standards and are 








= + = π .                          (14)  
Profits are lower the more stringent are the standards required in the MEA. We now turn to 
the first two stages of the game where the South decides whether or not to comply with 
environmental harmonization and the North chooses an optimal punishing tariff in the case of   13
non-compliance. By choosing to adopt standards, the South makes relocation redundant for 
the Northern firm and forces the latter to keep all production at home. When the South 
disagrees to adopt standards on the other hand, the Northern firm can decide whether to 
undertake FDI or completely delocate production using the approach explained in section 2.3.  
4. Optimal Policy by Governments 
4.1. Welfare   
This section introduces the components of welfare for the North and the South under each 
scenario. Economic welfare in this setting is the sum of consumer surplus and producer 
surplus minus the disutility caused by pollution, plus the tariff revenue for the North.  
Consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve and can be written as half of the total 
output intended for each region squared: 
. , , ,
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for FDI and delocation respectively. When standards are adopted, consumer surplus turns to 
S N i for e CS
H
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9
2 2
0 = − = τ .                                             (15c) 
Producer surplus with no standards in the North is the profits in (9b) and (9c) for FDI and 
delocation respectively. Producer surplus in the South on the other hand equals Southern 
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Equation (14) represents producer surplus for both regions with harmonized standards.  
The third component of welfare is the disutility caused by pollution in each region. This is 
parameterized as Di and contains total emissions in each region and a parameter di, which 
measures the concern of the population of a country about pollution:  




i , , ; , = = = .                       (17) 
Another interpretation for parameter di is the relative importance of the disutility caused by 
emissions against the utility gained from the other components of welfare.
17  
Pollution is assumed to be of the transboundary type.
18 Total world pollution depends on 
whether the non-signatory joins the MEA, the trade obligations of the MEA, and the location 
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when the multinational has a local subsidiary in each country and when it completely 
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The first order conditions of emissions released with respect to pollution taxes and tariffs 
show how the environment can be affected through government policies. The derivatives are 
trivially negative with respect to t and τ implying that green tariffs and emission taxes per se 
are beneficial for the environment. When delocation is binding (t<τe0), pollution is always 
lower when standards are harmonized. When FDI is the locational outcome on the other hand, 
                                                 
17 Disutility here increases monotonically with pollution. Other functional forms can be used to 
describe disutility, but the merits of the results remain the same. 
18 Note that most MEAs deal with transboundary or global issues. If pollution is local, there is no role 
for a MEA or the WTO.    15
pollution is lower only in a sub-region where t<3τe0. Higher tariffs prior to liberalizations 
reduce production by so much that pollution is actually lower than the harmonization case. 
The important question that needs to be asked here is whether environmental policies can be 
optimally implemented in isolation or in conjunction with trade obligations through a MEA, 
taking into consideration their consequences on firm location and output and hence on total 
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for j=F,D,H using the corresponding values found above for each component of welfare. T is 
the tariff revenue and equals unit tariff rate t times the total quantity exported to the North. 
4.2. Optimal Northern Tariff 
The welfare function derived in the previous section can now be used to see if it is optimal for 
the North to impose a punishing tariff on the South if the latter refuses to adopt the standards 
required in a MEA. The Northern government sets an optimal tariff that maximizes its welfare 
in the second stage for each scenario. It then compares Northern welfare for FDI and 
delocation using the respective optimal tariffs. Taking the decision of its firm on location into 
consideration, it chooses the optimal tariff that results in a higher Northern welfare.
19  
The optimal tariff for each case can easily be found by differentiating Northern welfare in 
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D = ,                                        (20b) 
for FDI and delocation respectively. The optimal tariff is positive for all levels of 
environmental standards and is increasing with higher pollution concerns in the North. Note 
from (20b) and (11) that a level of concern dN>τ implies a tariff rate of  t t
D > * ; therefore, 
                                                 
19 Recall that the tariff is set before the decision of the firm about location; therefore, there are no 
profit-shifting incentives present in the model.   16
t*
D is only binding for dN<τ as delocation only occurs in this range. When dN>τ, the 
maximum tariff where delocation is still possible, t , is instead chosen. Given the optimal 
tariffs, there is a threshold level of pollution tax under which the North prefers a FDI situation 
to complete delocation in terms of welfare. This is the τ, which makes welfare under FDI and 
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When unit emission is set to unity, this critical value of τ starts with 0.1 for dN=0 and is 
continuously increasing in dN at a slow rate.
20 Unless standards required in a MEA are 
unrealistically high, the Northern government prefers a FDI situation to delocation for all 
levels of dN when optimal tariffs are in place. This makes t*
F the relevant tariff for this region. 
A higher concern over pollution in the North simply increases the optimal tariff and the range 
of environmental tax where the North prefers FDI to delocation.  
The Northern optimal tariff is illustrated in figure 3 for dN=0 along the applicable range of τ. 
The effects of changes in dN on t*
F and τˆ are also demonstrated in the figure. The thick line 
illustrates the optimal tariff used, which is t*
F for the range of τ where FDI is preferable to 
delocation ( τ τ ˆ 0 ≤ ≤ ) and min {t , t*
D} thereafter. The optimal level of tariffs results in a FDI 
scenario in the region of interest implying that FDI for motives other than pollution is the only 
form of capital movement to the South. Even upon non-compliance by the South, delocation 
to pollution havens does not occur due to positive optimal tariffs, reinforcing empirical 
studies that have found weak or no evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis. Delocation is 
a purely theoretical outcome that only arises in the non-realistic case where pollution related 
costs amount to a very high fraction of total costs. This suggests an explanation for why 
                                                 
20 The qualitative results remain the same for other pollution intensities as all results adjust 
proportionally for different values of e0.   17
concerns over pollution havens are restricted to theory and not consistent with empirical 
evidence.  
Proposition 1   
A positive optimal Northern tariff makes FDI the equilibrium locational outcome if the South 
deviates and does not ratify. Pollution-related delocation hence does not take place in a 
plausible range of τ, discrediting the pollution haven hypothesis also in theory.     
Taking the MEA trade obligations into consideration, the Southern government moves in the 
first stage to commit to its optimal environmental policy. 
4.3. Optimal Southern Environmental Policy 
We turn to the first stage of the game to analyze the Southern government’s policy choice, 
namely whether to adopt standards and enjoy trade liberalization or to continue to ignore 
MEAs and pay punishing green tariffs. Looking at the Southern welfare function from (19) 
after substituting for its components from the appropriate equations, it is easy to demonstrate 
if adopting standards would be beneficial for the South. Comparing (15a) and (15b) with 
(15c), we can see that Southern consumer surplus is always lower when environmental 
standards are harmonized. Southern producer surplus also falls with the adoption of standards 
if delocation prevails under no standards (t<τe0). If FDI is the prospective non-compliance 
outcome on the other hand, there is a threshold tax level 
0
2 9 16 8 2 3 ~
e
t t t + − ± −
< τ  under 
which the Southern firm is better off when standards are harmonized in the two regions. This 
is due to tariff savings that arise from move to free trade. Yet, this advantage is only 
materialized for low values of τ, where switching policy results in higher total production by 




S π π >  for t>τe0 implies that the interests of the Southern 
firm are always in conflict with the Northern firm’s preferences on location.   
In the rest of this section, we focus on the case where there is no concern over pollution in the 
South (dS=0).
21 In a delocation scenario, the South never finds it optimal to ratify as it is 
                                                 
21 While this makes the notation much easier to follow, all results hold for positive values of dS.   18
strictly better off with no standards. When FDI is the locational outcome under no standards 
on the other hand, there is a critical level of τ below which ratification is desired by the South. 
This level of pollution tax solves for WS
F =WS




25 32 16 2 5
e
t t t + − ± −
= τ .          ( 2 2 )  
The hyperbola in figure 3 shows the locus where Southern welfare with ratification is equal to 
that of the FDI / no standards case. The area to the left of the curve is the region where the 
South is better off by adopting standards. Gains from producer surplus and tariff revenues 
outweigh consumer surplus losses in this region. Anticipating Northern optimal tariffs from 
the second stage t*
F, the South ratifies the MEA as the tariff makes the Southern policy 
choice fall right in the region where compliance is optimal. This makes harmonization the 
unique equilibrium outcome for the relevant range of τ. Here tariffs work successfully as a 
credible threat to motivate environmental harmonization without actually being put into 
practice. The Doha proposal can hence be deemed effective for fairly low values of τ 
consistent with data, and is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Only in the unlikely case 
of a very high τ, standards would not be adopted and the equilibrium outcome turns to 
delocation.  
Proposition 2   
Trade obligations, i.e. green tariffs, work as a credible threat to persuade the South to ratify a 
MEA that requires an upgrading of its standards. The Doha proposal is hence effective as 
environmental harmonization with trade liberalization is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome for a modest range of τ.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the importance of MEA trade obligations for a successful round of 
international environmental negotiations. It particularly emphasizes on the proposal made at 
the Doha round of the WTO with regards to the introduction of conditional consent for 
economic integration upon ratification of certain MEAs. Non-cooperation in this case allows   19
for punishing tariffs against a country with environmental standards weaker than those set out 
in the MEA. Building a framework to reflect the Doha proposal, the paper shows that for a 
modest range of requirements, it is optimal for a non-signatory country to upgrade its 
standards according to the MEA. Trade obligations in the MEA work only as a credible threat 
to deter delocation and motivate environmental harmonization. Even if the Southern 
government deviates, Northern optimal tariffs are positive so pollution motivated delocation 
never occurs.  
It was found in the light of Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) that unlike conventional 
environmental policy recommendations, a policy to control pollution can only be optimal 
when it is a mix of complementary measures. Since a pollution tax alone may not be an 
effective policy tool, its role must be reassessed and trade obligations must be considered 
when reaching out for environmental targets. If green tariffs can serve as a successful threat 
against delocation and eco-dumping policies, they may at times be the only means of a move 
towards more successful international environmental negotiations. Yet, the paper shows that 
positive tariffs do not turn up in equilibrium.  
The model in the paper is only a cornerstone to highlight the basic roles of green tariffs and 
the potential need for trade obligations to achieve the outcomes desired in a MEA. It can 
easily be extended to investigate an optimal emission tax rate for each region, or one to study 
whether a world optimal tariff through an international body can be used to induce 
participation in a MEA when the latter is globally optimal. It is interesting to study the effects 
of such tariffs and/or emission tax on the R&D effort by firms to abate pollution. It is also 
important to look into more direct measures of improving the environment such as abatement 
R&D subsidies to avoid creating a distortion. It must however be taken into account that such 
subsidies must be financed from costly taxation. Extending the model to include more 
countries is a next step to see the impact of the number of signatories on the decision of a 
non-signatory in regards to ratification. Another interesting line of research is to study the 
issue into a multi-firm, multi-sector general equilibrium framework.    20
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Figure 1: R&D investment by the Northern Firm 
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